I intended to read a few paragraphs and return tomorrow morning, but this fascinated me. The 0-balk wrinkle added another interesting element. Your writing always l locks me in—I like following your thinking and exploring—but this was yet another piece where even just the question was clever and immediately engaging.
(Also fun: the person I teach Calculus with grew up next door to Ryan Drese! Always fun to see his name pop up in a story or on a list for that serendipity alone!)
Thank you, and for passing on the Ryan Drese coincidence. In thinking about it, I don't think there is any difference in kind between a coincidence of numbers (like with Carpenter and Cueto) and one of association. At the very least, I think people who enjoy one kind enjoy the other. When you take in that association, you are after all asking a statistical/logical question about it, and whether it really IS a coincidence.
Even within the major league bubble of people who by definition played baseball very well to be there, I especially admire those who could do any one thing very well, as Drese obviously could with controlling the running game. And he didn't have Pudge behind the place in 2003 and 2004 with Texas, either, to help him, as I had assumed. Pudge signed with the Marlins in '03, and must have won the World Series with them, before moving on to Detroit..
Drese allowed more hits per 9 innings than anyone on this list, and this time the environment of Texas (112 2004 Run Park Factor) certainly serves as an excuse. The other guys in double digits in hits per 9 innings on the list were Dallas Green (10.4) and Ed Lynch (10.0).
Drese allowed a .299 career average. Although at just .29924, with 2249 opposing at-bats, that actually comes to .300 with one more hit. Maybe he has an official scorer to thank.
In 2004, Drese had a 3.26 E.R.A. at home, a 5.22 on the road, so maybe the Texas theory doesn't check out with him.
I appreciate the added context! That one-more-hit observation floors me—there is a huge difference in perception between .299 and .300.
Thinking about your topic here overnight, I realized that one reason I really appreciate this one is that it’s difficult to pick up without extensive study (either watching or data-digging). Any casual viewer can SEE a left good at controlling the running game because of those pick-off throws; it’s far tougher to see with righties. I have no doubt those Cardinals could have spoken to Benes’ run game skill, but I doubt I would have caught that.
If I had to guess, the below piece was probably one of the poorer ones in one of my least popular categories (and certainly a piece that would have benefited from more work, if nothing else) but is on the batting average shift topic, and reminds me of one reason why I was able to say that "an official scoring decision could shift Drese's average one point." One has to distinguish between taking an out of Drese's and shifting it to a hit, and saying that the NEXT batter against him gets a hit, and measuring the effect of that.
When it comes to base stealing, everyone is mercilessly analytical these days. Staffs and players realize a lot of the percentages come down to just how fast the batter can get the ball home. Not a lot of the romance indulged that a Cool Papa Bell can be in bed before the light goes out and will be above the odds. However, while few liked to watch throws to first, by restricting that, some of this art you mention is removed from the game. We give the pitcher less say over the running game than before. I see an analogy to the functional reality that a player really can't break up a double play any more. That one actually removes skill from both the runner and the fielder. The fielder doesn't have to contend with the runner, so anyone can turn a double play. That Ruben Tejada rule might not have been adopted without industry-wide agnozing, but its effects seem profound to me, both materially and aesthetically, and yet now we all assume it has been a net positive because of the added safety. There certainly were fewer injuries in the old game, with the greater double play risk more than offset by less power lifting, virtually no 98 MPH fastballs thrown, etc.
I intended to read a few paragraphs and return tomorrow morning, but this fascinated me. The 0-balk wrinkle added another interesting element. Your writing always l locks me in—I like following your thinking and exploring—but this was yet another piece where even just the question was clever and immediately engaging.
(Also fun: the person I teach Calculus with grew up next door to Ryan Drese! Always fun to see his name pop up in a story or on a list for that serendipity alone!)
Thank you, and for passing on the Ryan Drese coincidence. In thinking about it, I don't think there is any difference in kind between a coincidence of numbers (like with Carpenter and Cueto) and one of association. At the very least, I think people who enjoy one kind enjoy the other. When you take in that association, you are after all asking a statistical/logical question about it, and whether it really IS a coincidence.
Even within the major league bubble of people who by definition played baseball very well to be there, I especially admire those who could do any one thing very well, as Drese obviously could with controlling the running game. And he didn't have Pudge behind the place in 2003 and 2004 with Texas, either, to help him, as I had assumed. Pudge signed with the Marlins in '03, and must have won the World Series with them, before moving on to Detroit..
Drese allowed more hits per 9 innings than anyone on this list, and this time the environment of Texas (112 2004 Run Park Factor) certainly serves as an excuse. The other guys in double digits in hits per 9 innings on the list were Dallas Green (10.4) and Ed Lynch (10.0).
Drese allowed a .299 career average. Although at just .29924, with 2249 opposing at-bats, that actually comes to .300 with one more hit. Maybe he has an official scorer to thank.
In 2004, Drese had a 3.26 E.R.A. at home, a 5.22 on the road, so maybe the Texas theory doesn't check out with him.
I appreciate the added context! That one-more-hit observation floors me—there is a huge difference in perception between .299 and .300.
Thinking about your topic here overnight, I realized that one reason I really appreciate this one is that it’s difficult to pick up without extensive study (either watching or data-digging). Any casual viewer can SEE a left good at controlling the running game because of those pick-off throws; it’s far tougher to see with righties. I have no doubt those Cardinals could have spoken to Benes’ run game skill, but I doubt I would have caught that.
Again, great stuff.
If I had to guess, the below piece was probably one of the poorer ones in one of my least popular categories (and certainly a piece that would have benefited from more work, if nothing else) but is on the batting average shift topic, and reminds me of one reason why I was able to say that "an official scoring decision could shift Drese's average one point." One has to distinguish between taking an out of Drese's and shifting it to a hit, and saying that the NEXT batter against him gets a hit, and measuring the effect of that.
Drese at his retirement: 673 H/2249 AB, .29924
Drese shift: 674/2249, .29969
Drese next event: 674/2250, .29956
https://baseballmath.substack.com/p/a-cheat-sheet-to-relate-hits-and
When it comes to base stealing, everyone is mercilessly analytical these days. Staffs and players realize a lot of the percentages come down to just how fast the batter can get the ball home. Not a lot of the romance indulged that a Cool Papa Bell can be in bed before the light goes out and will be above the odds. However, while few liked to watch throws to first, by restricting that, some of this art you mention is removed from the game. We give the pitcher less say over the running game than before. I see an analogy to the functional reality that a player really can't break up a double play any more. That one actually removes skill from both the runner and the fielder. The fielder doesn't have to contend with the runner, so anyone can turn a double play. That Ruben Tejada rule might not have been adopted without industry-wide agnozing, but its effects seem profound to me, both materially and aesthetically, and yet now we all assume it has been a net positive because of the added safety. There certainly were fewer injuries in the old game, with the greater double play risk more than offset by less power lifting, virtually no 98 MPH fastballs thrown, etc.